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1Nothing in the study presented here hangs on the acceptance of modularity. For our
purposes, distinct moral systems could be entirely learned by domain-general
learning processes. Rather, we are interested in the replicability of the evidence in
support of separate moral systems, regardless of whether they reflect the innate
structure of domain-specific learning modules.Replicating different roles of
intent across moral domains
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Whether moral cognition is underpinned by distinct
mental systems that process different domains of moral
information (moral pluralism) is an important question for
moral cognition research. The reduced importance of intent
(intentional versus accidental action) when judging purity
(e.g. incest), when compared with harm (e.g. poisoning), moral
violations is, arguably, some of the strongest experimental
evidence for distinct moral systems or ‘foundations’.
The experiment presented here is a replication attempt of
these experimental findings. A pre-registered replication of
Experiment 1B from the original article documenting this
effect was conducted in a sample of N = 400 participants.
Findings from this successful replication are discussed in terms
of theoretical and methodological implications for approaches
to moral cognition.1. Introduction
Imagine siblings having consensual sex. This is probably difficult to
picture. Now imagine somebody causing physical harm to their
sibling. This is not such a difficult task, at least for those that have
experienced sibling rivalry. An even easier task though is to
assign a moral status to each of these actions. This is something
that people do intuitively across an endless variety of novel actions
[1]. Moral pluralism suggests that our moral judgements of
such cases involving harm and incest are underpinned by separate,
domain-specific moral modules1 or systems. For example, moral
foundations theory (MFT) posits that humans have distinct mental
modules or ‘foundations’ that process moral information across a
specific range of moral domains and their associated actions: harm
(e.g. assault), purity (e.g. incest), fairness (e.g. cheating), loyalty
(e.g. betrayal) and authority (e.g. disobedience) [2,3]. MFT claims
that these modules each process information in a bespoke manner
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2that reflects the particular selection pressures responsible for sculpting the evolution of that mental module.
For example, it posits that the harm system or foundation helps to meet the adaptive challenge of caring for
vulnerable offspring across an extended period of time, a common challenge for all mammals. It does this by
mapping perceptions of suffering (e.g. seeing someone being assaulted) to relevant moral cognitions (e.g.
feeling that this is morally wrong) and actions (e.g. motivations to help and protect).
Critics accuse moral pluralism of lacking parsimony, conceptual clarity, and methodological rigour
[4,5]. More generally, some evolutionary biologists have argued that while it is easy to give plausible
adaptationist ‘stories’ for the evolution of human cognition, it is much harder, perhaps even
impossible, to empirically test these as scientific hypotheses [6]. Regardless of whether we can answer
how human moral cognition evolved, understanding whether it is accurately characterized by a single
system or separate moral systems (moral pluralism) is an important question in its own right. Indeed,
correctly delineating and decomposing the phenomenon under inquiry is one of the standard steps
for developing theoretical explanation in the psychological and cognitive (neuro)sciences [7].
One way of proceeding to delineate and decompose cognitive phenomenon (e.g. memory) is to
demonstrate that some experimental manipulation ‘x’ (e.g. typeface) causally impacts one (sub)type of
the phenomenon ‘y1’ (e.g. implicit memory) differently from how it affects another (sub)type of the
phenomenon ‘y2’ (e.g. explicit memory) [7]. This approach has been taken with regard to the role of
intent across the moral domains of harm and purity, and provides, arguably, some of the strongest
experimental evidence for moral pluralism’s claim that our moral cognition is underpinned by
separate moral modules or systems.08082. Different roles of intent across moral domains
Given intent plays a crucial role in moral judgements of harm (e.g. murder versus manslaughter), Young
& Saxe [8] set out to examine whether this was also the case for purity violations (e.g. incest, eating taboo
foods). On the basis of anthropological observations, they predicted that intent would not exculpate
purity violations to the same extent as harm violations. They found just that: the exculpatory effect of
innocent intentions was significantly reduced for purity compared to harm violations. For example,
accidentally poisoning a cousin with an undisclosed peanut allergy was judged less morally wrong
than accidentally committing incest with a long-lost sibling (Experiments 1–3). However, intentional
harm was either judged the same as, or worse than, intentional purity violations. Put differently, the
simple main effect of mental state (intentional versus accidental) was stronger for harm than purity
violations. This is taken as evidence for the separate cognitive processes or ‘signatures’ underpinning
moral judgements in these domains. Young & Saxe draw on, admittedly speculative, functional
explanations to account for the different cognitive processes underpinning moral judgements of harm
and purity violations. For example, they suggested that intent is important for harm violations as it
helps us identify who will cooperate with us in the future. By contrast, such information is less
important for purity violations where it is the act, rather than the intention, that it said to serve the
function of signalling group membership and cohesion.
There has been further converging evidence for, or ‘conceptual replication’ of, the mental state ×
domain interaction [9,10]. However, pre-registered, independent, close or ‘direct’ replication of such a
key result is important if we are to better understand the mechanisms underlying moral cognition.
More specifically, having replicable phenomena to explain is a necessary prerequisite for the difficult
task of discovering the mechanisms that explain such phenomena.3. Replication of Experiment 1B
We aimed to independently replicate Young & Saxe’s finding for the reduced exculpatory value of
innocent intentions in purity (versus harm) violations. Although Young & Saxe demonstrated the
targeted effect in four separate experiments (Experiments 1A, 1B, 2 and 3), we planned a close
replication of Experiment 1B. We chose this particular experiment for two reasons. First, it was the
only study which presented moral dilemmas in the third-person (e.g. Sam knows/has no idea). The
remaining studies presented dilemmas in the second-person (e.g. you know/have no idea). This is
potentially problematic as it has been argued, convincingly, that the use of second-person (versus
third-person) dilemmas risks increasing the role of exogenous (external to core moral cognition)
factors [11]. Therefore, it is important to replicate this effect employing dilemmas in the third-person.
Second, this experiment had the smallest sample size of Experiments 1A (N = 262), 1B (N = 80),
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32 (N = 320) and 3 (N = 160). Replication is important in this case as small samples are likely to
overestimate effect sizes and lead to low reproducibility of results [12].
3.1. Method
This article received in-principle acceptance (IPA) at Royal Society Open Science on 6 June 2019.
Following IPA, the accepted Stage 1 version of the manuscript was pre-registered on the OSF at
https://osf.io/wjg63/. This pre-registration was performed prior to data collection and analysis.
Furthermore, all materials, data and analysis scripts are openly available in the OSF online repository
at https://osf.io/t7mzb/. Our pre-registered method employs the detailed materials supplied as
supplementary material for the original article. We contacted the first author asking for their
comments on our pre-registration plan and materials. They immediately responded that they were
happy with the replication materials, but later clarified that mental state information was never
presented to participants in bold, as could be inferred from the original supplementary material. Any
differences from the originally reported study or our pre-registration are clearly explained in the
following sections.
3.1.1. Participants and design
Four hundred participants (167 men, 227 women, 5 unspecified) were recruited through the online
crowdsourcing platform Prolific (prolific.ac), ages ranged from 18 to 64 years (M = 30.49, s.d. = 9.82).
The experiment took approximately 1 min to complete. Participants were, therefore, paid £0.09 to
complete the study at an hourly rate of £5.40. Young & Saxe employed the MTurk platform to sample
their participants. We chose to use Prolific as our crowdsourcing platform because of the ease of
accessing existing credit to pay participants on this platform. Prolific samples have been shown to
replicate known effects and to produce similar quality data as MTurk samples, and they have the
added advantage of more naive, and less dishonest, participants compared to MTurk [13,14].
The experiment was a 2 (mental state: intentional versus accidental) × 2 (domain: harm versus purity)
between-participants design. Based on the reported effect size estimate of h2p ¼ 0:07 for the mental state ×
domain interaction, only 175 participants were required to achieve 95% power in a 2 × 2-design with an
α-level of 0.05. We assume that the true effect size may be smaller than reported. We thus aimed for a
sample of 400 participants, which is five times the original sample size of 80. This would result in a
power of 95% to detect an effect h2p ¼ 0:032, an effect less than half the size of that reported.
3.1.2. Materials and procedure
Participants made a moral judgement of the actions of an agent (Sam) in one of the four scenarios. The
harm violation involved intentionally (or accidentally) poisoning a cousin, while the purity violation
involved intentionally (or accidentally) engaging in incest with a long-lost sibling (see Materials at
https://osf.io/t7mzb/). Participants judged the moral wrongness of the action described in the
scenarios on a 7-point scale, anchored at (1) not at all morally wrong to (7) very morally wrong. The
scenarios and response scale were taken directly from Experiment 1B of the supplementary material
supplied in the original article. The experiment was conducted within the Qualtrics environment
(contact the primary author for a copy of the materials in the Qualtrics environment).
3.1.3. Statistical analysis
The analyses followed that in the original paper. Specifically, we tested the mental state × domain
interaction using a two-way ANOVA and planned comparisons. We supplemented this original
approach with Bayesian hypothesis testing. Bayes factors have some advantages over traditional
frequentist approaches ( p-values) and are now becoming commonplace in psychological and cognitive
(neuro)science research, especially when we are interested in a symmetrical measure of evidence for
the alternative and null hypotheses [15]. As stated in the pre-registration, we excluded data from
participants that completed the study in under 7 s (the minimum time needed to read and respond to
the scenario and moral judgement question). We also excluded data from participants (N = 17)
reporting that they had previously completed the same study (see pre-registration and supplementary
robustness analyses for details at https://osf.io/t7mzb/). Finally, as stated in the pre-registration, we
evaluated our replication results based on a number of approaches: vote-counting based on p-values
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Figure 1. Moral judgements as a function of mental state (intentional versus accidental) and domain (harm versus purity). Error
bars reflect 95% CIs.
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rsos
R.Soc.Open
Sci.7:190808
4and effect sizes, confidence intervals and the ‘small telescopes’ approach [16] and replication Bayes
factors for ANOVA results [17].4. Results
First, we report the results for the mental state × domain interaction and then summarize the success of
the replication attempt from several perspectives. Analyses were completed using R. The data and scripts
for all analyses are available at https://osf.io/t7mzb/.
4.1. Mental state × domain effect
The mental state × domain interaction was statistically significant, F1, 379 = 45.50, p < 0.001, h2p ¼ 0:11, 95%
CI [0.06, 0.16]; BF10 = 1.36 × 10
8 ± 7.3% for the full model compared with the main effects-only model. As
seen in figure 1, planned comparisons revealed that the exculpatory effect of innocent intentions (i.e. the
simple main effect of mental state) was significant, with greater magnitude, for the harm violation
(t379 =−22.09, p < 0.001; BF10 = 6.47 × 1066 ± 2.9% for the unconstrained model compared with the
simple-effect-constrained model) compared to the purity violation (t379 =−12.50, p < 0.001; BF10 =
2.78 × 1027 ± 15% for the unconstrained model compared with the simple-effect-constrained model).
Taken together, these findings suggest strong evidence for the exculpatory effect of innocent intentions
being greater for harm compared to purity violations.
4.2. Evaluation of replication success
Considering the estimated effect sizes and their respective 95% CIs (figure 2), our replication has higher
power and a consistent, but slightly larger, effect size estimate than the original study. All confidence
intervals for d exclude zero. The ‘small telescopes’ approach [16] suggested that the original study had
33% power to detect a ‘small effect’ of d33%= 0.5. As seen in figure 2, the original study’s confidence
interval includes the ‘small effect’, while our replication does not. Thus, our replication is consistent
with the notion that the studied effect is large enough to have been detectable with the original sample size.
By testing the hypothesis that the effect in a replication study is consistent with the original finding
against the hypothesis that there is no effect, the replication Bayes factor provides relative evidence for, or
against, a successful replication [17]. The replication Bayes factor for the mental state × domain effect was
BFr0 = 4.7 × 10
8, indicating strong evidence in favour of a consistent effect. Put differently, the model with
a prior based on the original study’s posterior is about 4.7 × 108 times more likely than the model with an
effect size of f2 = 0, assuming balanced groups in both studies. Taken together, these findings offer strong
support for a successful replication of the original mental state × domain effect.
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Figure 2. Results from Young & Saxe’s [8] Experiment 1B and our replication (Sweetman & Newman, present study). Effect-size
estimates and their confidence intervals are plotted. The dashed line indicates the effect size (d33% = 0.5) that would give the
original study, with a sample size of 20 per cell, 33% power.
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55. Discussion
We find strong evidence for the mental state × domain interaction effect. Specifically, we successfully
replicate the reduced exculpatory value of innocent intentions in purity (versus harm) violations
reported in Experiment 1B of Young & Saxe’s original article [8]. This provides the first pre-registered,
independent, close replication of the mental state × domain interaction effect. Taken together with
other converging fMRI and cross-cultural evidence [9,10], the mental state × domain interaction effect
seems like a reliable and robust effect. Despite most studies of the effect employing second-person
(versus third-person) dilemmas that risk increasing the role of exogenous factors [11], we, along with
others [10], find evidence for the effect when dilemmas are presented in the third-person. This
suggests that the effect cannot be explained by any increase in exogenous factors associated with the
use of second-person moral dilemmas.
More broadly, our findings offer more support for the idea that our moral judgements of cases
involving harm and purity are underpinned by separate, domain-specific moral modules or systems
[2,3]. That said, simply because we replicate an effect does not mean that the theory said to explain
the effect is correct [18]. There are other (than moral pluralism) explanations of the effect that need to
be tested in future research. Harm and purity dilemmas employed in the literature differ in more than
simply their moral domain. For instance, there is evidence that the purity dilemmas employed in the
literature are ‘weirder’ and less severe than the corresponding harm dilemmas [5]. These unresolved
confounds of content differences with moral domain must be systematically addressed in future
research. Indeed, such differences may point towards explanations of the mental state × domain
interaction effect that are more domain-general in nature. Huebner et al. [19] offer a similar
perspective when considering the role of emotion in moral psychology. Specifically, the authors
argued that emotion could impact moral cognition through its impact on attentional processes.
Analogously, the weirdness of purity (versus harm) scenarios may compete with standard moral
cognition for attentional resources. This could lead to a failure to integrate mental state information
into the computations underlying moral cognition in these cases. This may explain the reduced
exculpatory effect of innocent intentions in the purity (versus harm) domain without having to evoke
separate, domain-specific moral systems. Future research is needed to test among domain-specific and
more domain-general explanations of the effect.
An important limitation of the present replication attempt is that it is based on one sole set of stimuli
for each domain—namely, poisoning a cousin (harm) and engaging in incest with a long-lost sibling
(purity). The extent to which we can generalize to all harm and purity violations is uncertain. Stimuli
royalsocietypublishing.org
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generalizability of classic effects in moral cognition research [21]. Experiments 1A, 2 and 3 in the original
Young & Saxe study employed two sets of stimuli for harm and eight sets (four incest and four ingestion
of taboo substances) for purity. However, it seems that these were not analysed in a way that
would address stimuli sampling issues [20]. We can gain some confidence in the generalizability of
the effect to physical harm, incest and ingestion of taboo substances from more recent research that
has found the effect with item-wise analysis, employing 24 sets of physical harm and 24 sets of purity
(12 incest and 12 ingestion of taboo substances) scenarios [9]. However, this work also needs close,
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Sci.7:1908086. Conclusion
This carefully designed and conducted replication study does not provide final or absolute evidence for
the mental state × domain interaction effect, but it does add to the evidence for the effect. We think this
(successful) replication moves us closer to understanding the mechanisms underlying moral cognition.
Specifically, having a replicable phenomenon to explain is a necessary prerequisite for the challenging
task of understanding the mechanisms that explain such regularities in our moral cognition. We
suggest that the mental state × domain interaction effect offers researchers a potential foothold to
begin such explanatory work.
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